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Mobile agents are programs capable of migrating from one host
machine to another. We propose that mobile agents purchase re-
source access rights from host machines thereby establishing a market
for computational resources and giving agents a metric to evenly dis-
tribute themselves throughout the network. Market participation re-
quires quantitative information about resource consumption to dene
demand and calculate utility.
We create a formal utility model to derive user-demand functions,
allowing agents to eciently plan expenditure and deal with price
uctuations. By quantifying demand and utility, resource owners can
precisely set a value for a good. We simulate our model in a mobile
agent scheduling environment and show how mobile agents may use
server prices to distribute themselves evenly throughout a network.
1 Introduction
Mobile agents are programs that may, under their own volition, jump from
one host and resume execution at another host. We propose using electronic
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markets to regulate agent abilities and to create incentive for host owners
to allow foreign agents access to their domains. This method of regulation
requires hosts (resource owners) setting prices for outside access and allows
incoming agents (resource buyers) to buy access with an abstract currency.
We wish to use a market system to regulate agents, encourage them to
act responsibly, and evenly distribute themselves throughout the network.
Ideally, prices and congestion will be highly correlated: a congested resource
will become more expensive. Participants have a nite amount of currency,
thus agents have incentive to attempt to evenly spread themselves through-
out the network. This has the eect of implicitly distributing the decision-
making processes avoiding a central point of control. Finally, a large group of
independent agents can be thought of as a community, which gives an exper-
imental platform for developing and testing coordination algorithms inspired
be human societies.
For example, a mobile agent may migrate to a machine to access a par-
ticular database. The agent arrives with some amount of electronic cash
accepted by the server. The agent may plan to save some of the cash for
future points in its itinerary or simply return the change to the user. The
server's owner then uses the proceeds of the sale to endow her own agents or
possibly transfer the revenue into some other currency, say U.S. dollars.
The agent might express a preference to pay higher prices for faster ser-
vice. The server then calculates a price and a resource allocation for all
present agents.
As more agents arrive at the site, the server will most likely raise the price
of service to maximize prots. Rising prices encourage prospective agents to
look elsewhere. This gives agents a mechanism to compare server congestion
as well as incentive to distribute themselves evenly across the network.
There are several methods of pricing electronic markets proposed in [GSW97a,
MMMM95, WHH+92, WWWMM98, CW98], but little work has been done
on calculating mobile agents' or users' demand and utility. In this context,
utility denotes the satisfaction that a user or agent derives from consuming
a given resource. A commonly used utility model in microeconomics is the
Cobb-Douglas utility function [PR92], which we apply to generate functions
to model user demand and simulate agent resource markets.
In this model, an agent's demand function takes the market price for
a good and determines the amount that the agent would like to buy. A
demand function could be used by agents to determine when and how much
of a resource to buy. Individual agents' demand functions are derived from
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utility functions.
A market-demand function determines how much the market, as an ag-
gregate entity, will buy at any given price. To set prices, sellers must estimate
the market-demand function. In doing this, resource owners discover infor-
mation necessary to optimally price their resources.
Normally, a vendor must take its competitors' immediate actions into
account. In our model, competing vendors are typically located at other sites
and agents may only deal with those vendors currently at the site. However,
agents have the capability to relocate to more a desirable location to deal
with other vendors and we assume that agents have some knowledge about
prices of resources throughout the network.
Market-demand functions are calculated from the demand of individu-
als participating in the market. A natural problem that arises is how the
seller acquires information concerning individual demand. In this paper we
examine a solution that uses a form of auction where buyers submit demand
functions, which sellers use to compute competitive prices. An important
aspect of this approach is setting up the auction so that there is incentive for
prospective buyers to be honest in their bidding.
We study this style of market with the intent of applying it to an existing
mobile-agent system, D'Agents [Gra97], and to other related applications.
One problem mobile-agent system designers face is how to allocate resources
to agents. Here, we dene resources as access to any computing device or
service an agent may use. Examples include compute or network access time
and database access. We hope to nd empirical evidence that markets pro-
vide agents with the motivation to evenly distribute themselves throughout
the network.
In this paper we present a formal utility model and evaluate its use in a
mobile-agent scheduling system. In particular, we examine its eectiveness in
balancing load and the overhead of information required to drive the system.
This paper is organized as follows. We rst discuss why mobile agents
require regulation and why markets are a good candidate method. We briey
cover existing relevant work. Then we present a utility model and show how
agent servers can compute ecient prices for a scheduling resource. We
discuss a simulated implementation of our model and we conclude with some
remarks on our future work that concerns load balancing and mitigating
mobile agents' risk through the use of call options.
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2 Motivation
Consider a mobile-agent system in which agents migrate to a random host
to perform their computation. Initially, for simplicity, assume that all hosts
are identical. An active unregulated mobile-agent system has a propensity
to allow signicant groups of agents to accumulate at a single site. A quick
calculation gives us a rough estimate of the expected highest load in the
network by using a standard application of the Cherno bound [SW94]. If X
is a sum of independent random variables, Xi, where each Xi 2 [0; 1], then
for any  > 0:
Pr[X  (1 + )]  e min(;2)=3
where  is the expected value of X. Let n denote the number of agents in the
system and Xi the event that the i
th agent jumps to a given host. Assuming
that the Cherno bound is tight and that agents have an equal chance of
ending up at any one of m hosts, then we would expect some site to have a
reasonable chance of hosting a cluster of agents of size:
n=m+max(
p
3c lnm; 3 lnm)
Where n=m is the expected number of agents per site. The estimate is
obtained by setting the right hand side of the Cherno bound to 1=m and
solving for . If there is a 1=m chance that more than this number of agents
will jump to a given site, then there is approximately a 1 (1 1=m)m chance
of at least one site experiencing this load.
2.1 Markets
Since hosts risk having a signicant additional load and expose themselves
to possible security problems by allowing additional users, there is little in-
centive for a system owner to open up their system to a mobile-agent system,
greatly limiting mobile-agent applications.
A network such as a mobile-agent system has a value that is quadratic to
the number of users. By creating incentive for more hosts to participate in
the mobile-agent system, we increase its intrinsic value.
We propose to establish a system that rewards owners for opening their
resources to the public: allow resource owners to sell access to outside users
and have resource owners distribute the proceeds to users at their sites, who
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will in turn give cash to their own agents to use elsewhere. Essentially, this
creates an economy of agents.
In addition to reimbursing resource owners, the use of a market to control
mobile agents has the potential to evenly distribute agent load throughout the
network. Generally, there is a strong correlation between consumer demand
(i.e. generating congestion) and higher prices. Thus a site experiencing a
high load should set a higher price to maximize prots and to encourage
agents to move to a site charging a lower price.
2.2 Utility
A market's eciency depends on the consumers' ability to assess their needs
and then make rational decisions that maximize their utility. Here, utility
is a measure of the pleasure a market participant derives from consumption
of a good. There are few studies about the source or measurement of agent
utility in an electronic market.
Without formalizing utility, there is little certainty in the validity of eco-
nomic choices. Here we apply well-known utility models to market-structured
agent systems and examine the results. Primarily, we are concerned with
three attributes that aect agents.
The rst property is cost. We limit every agent's monetary resources, so
an agent that pays a higher price for service eectively limits the amount
of utility it can generate in the future. This is an example of how currency
can be considered an abstract good representing future consumption, even
though cash holdings have no direct immediate value.
The second property we use is quality of service measured in terms of
completion time. This is dependent on resource congestion and the hardware
providing service.
There could be other qualities besides completion time. In information-
retrieval tasks, for example, accuracy is an issue. This can be a dicult
concept to measure algorithmically, so we will consider it in this paper.
Finally, there may be some question of an agent's chance of successfully
completing a task. For some users, there is utility in risk avoidance. It would
be perfectly reasonable for users to negotiate the level of risk based upon their
preferences. For example, a user might want to pay more for a task that will
complete with high probability. Conversely, a user might expect a discount
on a service of questionable reliability.
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3 Related Work
There is a substantial body of work on pricing in electronic markets. There
are two methods: systems can compute the optimal equilibrium prices exactly
or estimate the equilibrium prices based upon the past.
We are primarily interested in the former, and we build upon ideas taken
from WALRAS [CW98] and Smart Auctions [MMV95] where sellers com-
pute equilibrium prices by soliciting bids from buyers. In WALRAS, bids are
demand functions constructed from a vector of current prices. There is an
auctioneer for every good. Bids are submitted to the auctioneers, who com-
pute a price to match supply and demand. The auctioneers notify prospective
buyers of the new prices so that they may recalibrate demand functions for
future iterations. The process repeats until prices reach a steady state.
Smart Auctions uses a simpler algorithm. Here, sellers attempt to sell
some xed quantity of a good and receive price bids from buyers. The winning
bid is the highest bid, but the price is assigned to be the highest losing bid,
giving buyers incentive to submit honest bids.
If the process of computing prices exactly is costly or otherwise infeasible,
a dierent approach is to assume that an equilibrium exists and that a mature
market has an equilibrium that it is normally near. Using the recent past
and feedback from user consumption, it is possible to adjust past prices to
compute ecient current prices [GSW97b].
4 A Utility Model
To allow agents to plan their expenditures, we establish a formal goal at
which agents aim when making decisions. In economic systems, participants
generally try to maximize their utility, but we have yet to quantify utility or
see it quantied elsewhere. We use a modication of the traditional Cobb-
Douglas model from textbook microeconomics.
The Cobb-Douglas utility function is a frequently used method of express-
ing an individual's utility [PR92]. For two goods, S and R, the Cobb-Douglas
utility function is:
U(S;R) = a ln(S) + (1  a) ln(R) (1)
where S and R are the quantities consumed and a is some real number in [0; 1]
that describes an individual's taste for S relative to R. Representing utility
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in this manner provides us with diminishing marginal utility: a common
theme in life; having a lot of something is nice, but having twice as much is
not twice as nice.
Consider a scenario where agents are concerned with two qualities: pri-
ority in some scheduling system and the amount of cash that they have after
being scheduled. This models a situation where a mobile agent jumps to a
machine and requests a block of execution time with some general priority.
For simplicity, we bundle together all of an agent's computational require-
ments.
First, we modify the utility function to account for the size of an agent's
task:
U(S;R) = a ln(QS) + (1  a) ln(R) (2)
where Q is the size of the job in some \units," S is the throughput in job
units per second, and R is the extent of the agent's remaining currency supply
upon completing the task. The product QS weights the importance of the
job with respect to its size. Using the product of Q and S instead of the
quotient gives us units expressed in time, but execution time is an economic
bad for the agent. The use of seconds as units would require us to modify
the Cobb-Douglas further.
Agents have a budget constraint of:
I = QP +R (3)
where I is the agent's initial endowment, QP is the expenditure (quantity Q
times price P ), and R is remainder (savings).
It is now possible to derive an individual's demand function by solving
for the Marginal Rate of Substitution, MRS, of performance, S, for savings,
R, which we denote as MRSSR. This is the quotient of the partial derivative
of utility with respect to performance, @U=@S, and the partial derivative of
utility with respect to savings, @U=@R. Here theMRSSR measures how much
savings an agent is willing to give up to achieve one more job unit per second
performance. At a competitive equilibrium, MRSSR should be equal to the





(1  a)S = P (4)
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We use Equation (4) and the budget constraint, Equation (3), to generate
a demand function that returns the scheduling priority (in job units per
second) an agent would buy for a given price. Note that this function should




(1  a)P ; 0
!
(5)












Ii; ai, and Qi are constants describing the agents wishing to execute at
the host. In the short term, Stotal is xed and we assume that the sellers have
no ability to create additional resources. Given that agents have the ability
to travel to other sites selling the same resource, there is competition among
host sites. Sellers can maximize both total utility and the prots by selling
all of the available resources to agents.
The clearing price for a system with n agents is computed by solving











8i 2 [1 : : : n] : PQi  Ii (7)
When PPQi > Ii, the rst argument of the max() function in Equation 6 is
negative, thus the terms drop out from the sum.
Every time an agent arrives at a host site, the host computes the new mar-
ket demand, though Equation (7) gives only a static solution where all agents
arrive at the same time. By adjusting the utility function in Equation (2) to
account for consumption in two sessions, Q1 and Q2, with service rates S1
and S2, time lengths T1 = Q1=S2 and T2 = Q2=S2, and per unit prices P1 and
P2, we can arrive at a general solution. The new utility function becomes:







+ (1  a) ln(I  Q1P1  Q2P2) (8)
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As in Equation (2), the term inside the rst logarithm is derived from the
product of the size of the task, Q1+Q2, and the average throughput. Q2=S2
is substituted for T2 to eliminate a variable.
By computing the MRSSR in the same fashion as the static solution, we
arrive at the same solution if T1 and Q1 are zero. Otherwise the agent's








if T1; Q1 6= 0 (9)
Again, market demand is computed by summing the individuals' demand
functions, though now the clearing price must be found using a numeri-
cal root-nding method. Locating the clearing price can be done relatively
quickly using one of several algorithms from [PTVF92] since the aggregate
demand is well behaved around the market-clearing price.
Since hosts have preferences for resource access similar to agents, the
host's consumption can be taken into account by including the host's demand
in these calculations, and eectively having the host pay itself for access.
Note that the host can pay itself as much as it wants to discourage foreign
access or increase the priority of local jobs.
5 A Simulation
We would like to investigate a market's eciency as a load balancing in-
strument. We have implemented a simulation of an agent scheduler accept-
ing foreign agents having preferences described by our Cobb-Douglas based
utility function, Equation (8). Figure 1 shows a diagram of the simulation
execution of each server.
5.1 A Single Server
We rst proceed by assuming that there is only a single site agents. The
simulation is implemented in C++ with numerical routines from [PTVF92].
In our simulation, the server allocates execution time to incoming agents
by searching the aggregate demand function for a market clearing price every
time an agent enters or exits the system. Agents arrive at a Poisson arrival














yesno is next event
Figure 1: A owchart illustrating the actions of the simulator.
standard in processor queueing systems. The other two input parameters are
agent-scheduling-saving preferences, a, and endowment size, I.
Each agent has an exponentially distributed number of destination hops
in its itinerary. The a parameter denotes how much the agent wishes to save
for consumption at future destinations and is computed from the ratio of the
computation at the next destination to the remaining computation in future
hops.
I is computed from a, Q, and a normally distributed random variable
dening the agent's owner's view of the job importance to weight the impor-
tance of a job linearly with its size. Our decision to use a normally distributed
income parameter is arbitrary; the motivation is provide some variation of
user preferences.
Users express their preference for scheduling priority by establishing their
agent's endowments. The agent then uses the a parameter to express how
much of its endowment it would like to spend at a given site. The simulation
computes what portion of the original endowment is left given the amount
of the job done to adjust I to reect previous consumption.
The simulation shows what we expected: resource price is positively cor-
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related with the number of users present. To measure market eciency, we
use the Spearman rank correlation coecient [PTVF92] of price to load,
where load is the sum of the sizes of jobs waiting to be completed.
Varying the client arrival intensity has little eect on the load-price cor-
relation. Interestingly, the market requires some variation in user preference
to eciently allocate resources. Figure 2 shows how market eciency, ex-
presses as load-price correlation, is directly related to the variance in agent
endowment. Here we examine the endowment relative to the job size, the




























Figure 2: Price-load correlation versus agent endowment variance expressed
as the variance of per-unit endowment relative to the mean per-unit endow-
ment.
Given a bursty Poisson arrival process, the market does a surprisingly
good job at nding a stable price. Figure 3 shows a histogram of prices
through a single simulation. About eighty percent of transactions have a
price within ve percent of the mean price though there are a few transactions















Figure 3: A histogram of the per unit price of computation through a single
simulation with twenty percent capacity mean load. Note that the ordinate
uses a logarithmic scale.
5.2 Multiple Servers
One of the driving assumptions in the use of markets is that they eciently
and implicitly distribute the decision-making processes. To test this, we
constructed a parallel simulation of mobile agents having to choose between
multiple identical services at separate sites.
Most load-balancing systems use mean response time as a metric of eec-
tiveness. Since our mobile agents are not only concerned with performance
but also with budget expenditure, mean response time is not necessarily a
good measure of system performance. Therefore we compare mean client
utility in identically seeded experiments to demonstrate the eectiveness of
pricing in distributing computing loads.
We make the assumption that clients believe that the additional load
incurred by their tasks will be negligible to the server. We leverage this to
simplify shopping. The client needs to examine the current price of access at
a server and calculate how much the client would like to buy given the price.
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As in the previous section, agents have a Poisson arrival rate with expo-
nential distributed job sizes. The variable element is now how agents choose
their destination. We examine two possibilities:
1. We may assume that there is perfect price knowledge, i.e, another agent
provides accurate up-to-date pricing information, possibly for a fee,
though we do not account for any such fees here.
2. An agent might choose only to look at the price of a xed number of
service locations.
For now, we assume that the population of clients use identical strategies.
When we assume that clients' location is xed at start up, there is the
question of how to place the agents. Agents may look at any number of
servers, but there might be a cost associated with \shopping." The results of
a simulation using ten servers shown in Figure 4 describe the average utility
derived when clients randomly choose a server, choose the best among two
randomly evaluated servers, choose the best among ve randomly selected
servers, and choose the best of all ten servers.1 We use an M/M/10 queue, a
single server with the capability of ten, as an ideal baseline comparison, since
using an M/M/10 queue is equivalent to assuming that agents can migrate
at any time to the \best" host.
The majority of the time, the price at a server occurs near the mean
as denoted by the histogram in Figure 3. Because of this, clients generally
do not have to check very many servers to nd reasonable performance. In
our simulation, checking the status of two servers was practically as good as
checking all of them.
The clients' ability to nd a random server provides a great deal of the
load balancing, but the ability to compare the status of a small number of
randomly selected servers smoothes the load even more as exhibited by the
higher utility values. In fact, checking a small number of servers comes very
close to providing ideal load balancing in terms of utility.
6 Discussion and Future Work
We see four important issues in using this model for resource scheduling:

























Figure 4: Mean utility versus the arrival rate relative to capacity.
 What are the roles of honesty and trust?
 What issues of policy design need to be corrected?
 How do we make the system even more stable?
 How is it possible to expand the model to handle multiple goods?
6.1 Honesty and Trust
One might argue that agents should not be willing to share budget infor-
mation with their hosts. If budget information is truly sensitive, the agent
should not be trusted with it; however the agent is already at the mercy of the
host site, since the host can examine the agent in any fashion it likes [Gra96].
Certainly, hosts that abuse agents will earn a bad reputation, and agents
will be reluctant to travel to such sites, thus lowering potential earnings from
resource sales. It is possible that important tasks could be performed jointly
by several agents in a \chunking" scheme as in [San97] to give hosts incentive
to act honestly.
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On the other side of the transaction, there is the question of whether
it is an agent's best interest to announce its preference for scheduling (a).
Intuitively, overvaluing a could oblige an agent to pay an inated price.
On the other hand, undervaluing the parameter could drive the price of
scheduling down at the risk of poor performance.
6.2 Cobb-Douglas and Economic Mechanism Design
We do see one drawback with the Cobb-Douglas utility function as applied
to this scenario: the utility approaches negative innity as S and R go to
zero, creating an extremely unhappy agent. Initially, this is not a problem
if the agent has the ability to assess market conditions and not enter unless
there is a reasonably high chance of completion. If market conditions take a
downturn midway through an agent's execution, one would expect a utility
model to account for the possibility that the agent cuts its losses and exits
the market, but it is generally desirable to construct market mechanisms such
that an agent will be better o utilizing the mechanism than abstaining from
use[WW98].
6.3 Strengthening Stability
One important quality of our model is that it quickly calculates a relatively
stable price even given a bursty stream of incoming requests. Approximately
80 percent of all transactions occur within ve percent of the mean price.
Infrequently, prices can jump well beyond the mean price. For applica-
tions where this is undesirable it would be possible for servers to sell call
options for scheduling, which are contracts allowing the holder to access the
resource for sometime in the future at a prearranged price. Such an option
might stabilize prices even further. [SHC96] shows that speculation on these
options might further stabilize the market.
Standard stock pricing models are based upon random walks, or modied
Weiner processes [Chr97]. In the absence of shifts in demand, our model's
prices denitely do not display the behavior of a random walk since prices
tend to return to an equilibrium. Further statistical analysis, possibly with
a real-life application, will give more insight on how to calculate the value of
options to be used in our model.
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6.4 Expanding the Market
Finally, our model only allocates one service among agents. In reality, agents
consume many resources. Computing general equilibrium prices exactly when
the market consists of more than two goods is possibly intractable [Ygg98,
PTVF92, p. 379]. We will address the problem of adding more commodities
to our market by investigating the needs of actual mobile-agent applications
to construct a general prole of consumable resources. This knowledge will
allow us to approximate all resources as a single abstract resource represent-
ing a weighted bundle of the consumables.
7 Summary
We present a mobile-agent scheduling method based upon rst microeco-
nomic principles. Agents are assumed to have preferences corresponding to
a Cobb-Douglas utility function, which we use to describe user satisfaction
in terms of savings and priority scheduling.
From this utility function, we describe how agents can create a demand
function to plan expenditure to maximize their utility. Using agent demand,
a host site can calculate optimal scheduling prices and hence an allocation.
We simulate a scheduler using these economic ideas to show that agents
can dynamically adapt their consumption habits to account for resource con-
tention. While it is likely that an agent will complete its task, there is
uncertainty in performance stemming from price uctuations. It would be
desirable for host sites to sell options to access an agreed upon portion of the
resource pool at a xed price for a period of time. This sort of instrument is
essentially an American-style call option.
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